The Wolf in Sheep’s Skin: Promises and Realities of Religious Freedom in China
Grace Gaffet
Photo of Kaifeng North Mosque by Windmemories (CC BY-SA 4.0)
The following essay is reprinted and adapted on Canopy Forum in collaboration with the journal Derecho en Sociedad, a biannual electronic publication that is free and open access. See other essays in this series here.
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has declared itself as an atheist state. According to the 2020 World Religion Database, the non-religious, including atheists and agnostics, are the largest religious group in the PRC, consisting of forty percent of the population. This is followed by the Chinese folk-religionists, who make up thirty percent of the population and Buddhists who make up sixteen percent. Christians, Muslims, and Daoists are religious minorities, which consist of less than fourteen percent in total. In its International Religious Freedom Report, the U. S. State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom estimated that there were between seven to twenty million Falun Gong practitioners in 2017.
The Constitution of the PRC declares its respect for the freedom of religion or belief of all religious individuals and groups in the first two paragraphs of Article 36. The first paragraph guarantees that every Chinese citizen can enjoy the freedom of religion or belief, and the second paragraph asserts that no citizen can be coerced to believe or not to believe in any religion. However, the last two paragraphs require closer attention, as some specific words and phrases reflect the true intentions and concerns of the Chinese government. The beginning of the third paragraph states that the Chinese government “shall protect normal religious activities.” How does the Chinese government led by Xi Jinping interpret “normal religious activities”? Does it protect some religious activities but not others? Does the protection of the state come with specific conditions? Finally, the last paragraph states that “religious groups and religious affairs shall not be subject to control by foreign forces.” Why does “control by foreign forces” give rise to the Party-state’s concern? What exactly does “foreign forces” refer to? To answer these questions, we must first delve into the historical background of politics and religion in China.
Historical Development of the Party and Different Religions
China originally dominated trade with the West. However, after a century of humiliation, China was subjugated by foreign powers. When Chinese sovereignty was established in East Turkestan in 1911, the local Uyghur Muslim population that inhabited the region fought for their independence, but they were defeated in 1949. In that same year, Mao Zedong founded the PRC. As Mao endorsed Marxism-Leninism, the Party was hostile to religion, and foreign missionaries were expelled. The CCP regarded atheism as one of its basic doctrines and reinforced its ideology. Nonetheless, the Party-state recognized five official religions: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. Among them, only Daoism is genuinely Chinese, the rest were imported from overseas. The Party followed the religious policies of the Soviet Union until the Cultural Revolution. It desired to control religion in China because the CCP feared that religious powers threatened its sovereignty.
Eventually, the Party thus set up the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) in 1951. Under the direction of the United Front Work Department, the SARA oversaw the operations of the five officially sanctioned religious organizations, such as the supervision of clergy appointments and the interpretation of religious doctrine. More importantly, it ensured all registered religious bodies supported and implemented the CCP’s policies. Nevertheless, not all religious individuals and groups surrendered. The Vatican denied the validity of the state-appointed bishops as true Catholics, which caused the Catholic loyalists of the Vatican to go underground. Protestant church leader Wang Mingdao disagreed with the ideology of the CCP and refused to join the state-sanctioned Protestant church organization. His refusal is perceived as the beginning of the house church movement. In the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution began and led to the persecution of both authorized and unauthorized religions. Religious leaders were imprisoned or killed, and religious materials and buildings were destroyed.
After Mao died, Deng Xiaoping rose to power. According to G. Wright Doyle and Eleanor Albert, Deng’s 1979 “Open Door” policy of opening China to the outside world and releasing imprisoned religious leaders brought gigantic growth of Christianity in the 1980s, with Christianity first spreading in house churches created in rural areas. In 1982, the Central Committee of the CCP promulgated “Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period.” This document and Article 36 of the Constitution of the PRC formed the “1982 framework.” The Party launched anti-religious campaigns to restrict the religious freedom of religious adherents and groups, yet their numbers increased. The Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 prompted pro-democracy intellectuals in urban communities to pivot toward religious practices, including Christianity. Since the 1990s, urban churches have rapidly grown in numbers. Marie-Eve Reny explains that, although the Public Security Bureau (the police force at the prefecture level) was responsible for prosecuting and preventing illegal activities of the unregistered churches, these activities were tolerated under the conditions of containment bargain (such as no engagement in political activism). On the other hand, Falun Gong, a spiritual practice, was initially supported by the government in the 1990s and became popular. However, the Falun Gong was perceived as a threat to the Party by the late 1990s, according to this Freedom House report.
In 2013, Xi Jinping was elected as the President of China. He also became the General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In 2014, the Chinese government, due to the riots in Xinjiang, characterized the Muslims there as extremists. In 2017, the ideological doctrine “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (“Xi Jinping Thought”) was officially launched at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In 2018, three significant events happened in the PRC. First, Xi abolished the term limit for serving as President. Second, the Provisional Agreement on the appointment of Bishops was covertly made between the Holy See and the PRC. Third, the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs were enacted. After that, the Party-state governed religious affairs with tighter restrictions. For example, the CCP’s ideology was included in religious doctrines, and the Church’s operation was further limited. These restrictions elevated rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In sum, the Party-state has been violating the religious freedom of certain religious minorities, notably Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics, and it categorized the Falun Gong as a xiejiao (evil cult). This sort of religious repression has escalated since Xi took leadership.
The Meaning of “Normal Religious Activities” Revealed in the State Religious Regulations
Richard Madsen suggests that “normal religious activities” can be interpreted as activities within the church building, implying no mission activities. I suggest examining the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, which will give a more precise understanding of how the Party, under the leadership of Xi, interprets “normal religious activities.” These regulations restrain the activities of registered religious groups and prohibit those of the unregistered. Article 8 mandates that state-regulated religious groups cooperate with the government by implementing state laws, regulations, and policies. Moreover, four articles state that unregistered staff performing any religious activity in unregistered sites will receive heavy fines, and the sites themselves may face closure. However, in practice, two state-approved Three-Self churches that conducted minor’s religious activities were raided. In the end, one was threatened and another was punished. Therefore, “normal religious activities” include only adult religious activities within church buildings approved by the state. For the government, the term “normal” implies the obedience and loyalty of a religious group to the Party-state rather than the status of a religious group, whether registered or unregistered. Their allegiances to the Party may come in exchange for the government’s protection, yet this protection is not always guaranteed. Consequently, countless house churches were raided and closed, Protestants were arrested and imprisoned, Catholic leaders were forcibly kidnapped for re-education, and their family members were harassed and threatened.
Other measures launched after 2018, specifically the Measures for Administration of Internet Religious Information Services in 2022, have significantly impacted the dissemination of religious content and mission activities online. Additionally, the Party further enforced crackdowns on spiritual groups, including the Falun Gong. These groups are frequently prosecuted under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which forbids the use of a cult to undermine the implementation of laws and regulations. Not only were the Falun Gong arrested, imprisoned, and martyred, but they were also victims of forced organ harvesting.
The Eradication of “Foreign Influence” through Sinicization
China’s negative history with foreigners, the fact that the four official religions originated overseas, and the persistent rebellious activity perpetrated by the country’s unregistered religious groups have created paranoia in the Party-state. Facing potential foreign threats, Xi introduced the theory of “Sinicization of Religion” in 2015. It requires all of China’s religious groups to conform their religions to the CCP’s ideological doctrines by cultivating the core values of socialism. For the ethnic-religious groups, it also assimilates ethnic minorities into Chinese culture so that their individual cultural and religious identities will be erased. The Party has as an ultimate goal: all religious groups in China must submit to the CCP’s political agenda and remain loyal to the Party. Indeed, the direction of Sinicization can be initially found in Article 4 of the 2018 Regulations on Religious Affairs. It states that “the State…. Actively guides religion to fit in with socialist society…. Religious groups, religious schools, religious activity sites, and religious citizens shall… practice the core socialist values…” Subsequently, each state-controlled religious body released its “Five-Year Work Plans” (2018-22), giving instructions on how to “Sinicize” their religions. The new “Five-Year Work Plans” (2023-27) were launched to reinforce Sinicization efforts for all official religions.
Seminars and conferences were organized for all of China’s religions, guiding religious leaders to study Xi Jinping Thought and to adopt their religion to accommodate the values of a socialist society. The religious freedom of Christians, Uyghur Muslims, and Tibetan Buddhists was particularly violated. Church sermons were scrutinized to ensure that religious clergy had incorporated elements of Communist ideology. Between 2014 and 2016, hundreds of house churches, including Wenzhou Sanjiang Church, were demolished and thousands of crosses were removed in Zhejiang, particularly in Wenzhou city. This is because Wenzhou possesses one of the largest Christian communities in China. Additionally, the CCP appointed several bishops without the consent of the Vatican, which violated the Provisional Agreement that existed between them. In the name of anti-extremism due to the riots in 2014, the CCP started the re-education efforts and persecution of the Uyghur Muslims. The Uyghurs were tortured,involuntarily sterilized, forced to pledge loyalty to the Party, and renounce Islam and other cultural practices. This persecution can also be explained by the fact that the majority of the Muslim population in China are Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Finally, mosques in Yunnan and Buddhist temples and shrines in Tibet were converted into Chinese architecture. Tibetan children were sent to Chinese boarding schools to assimilate them culturally, religiously, and linguistically into Chinese society.
In conclusion, the laws, regulations, and policies in China conceal the Party-state’s ambitious conspiracy: these religions are undergoing an eradication in all but name. In other words, their unique doctrinal beliefs will gradually be eliminated and ultimately replaced by socialist patriotic doctrines. For the ethnic-religious groups, their cultural identity will be rejected. The more resistant these religious groups become to the efforts of Sinicization of the government, the fiercer the CCP’s repression of religious freedom will become. ♦
Grace Gaffet is a Master’s student in Theology and Religious Studies at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit Leuven. She holds a Master’s degree in Affaires Internationales from the Institut International du Commerce et du Développement Paris. She was the Violent Incident Database Researcher at the International Institute for Religious Freedom.
Recommended Citation
Gaffet, Grace. “The Wolf in Sheep’s Skin: Promises and Realities of Religious Freedom in China.” Canopy Forum, March 17, 2025. https://canopyforum.org/2025/03/17/the-wolf-in-sheeps-skin-promises-and-realities-of-religious-freedom-in-china/.
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